Introduction
Sections 16–19 of the National Communications Authority Act, 2008 (Act 769) grant the President extensive powers over the appointment and conditions of service of the leadership and staff of the National Communications Authority.85 In this paper, I trace the legal origins of this executive authority and examine the competing arguments that such control is necessary for national security, yet potentially harmful to regulatory independence and industry growth.
Historical Context and the Source of Power
The President’s appointment powers under Act 769 reflect a longstanding approach to communications governance in Ghana, where the sector has historically been treated as a matter of national security. Earlier legislation, including the 1996 Act, similarly granted the President authority to appoint the regulatory board.86 These powers can be traced further back to the 1977 Decree, under which appointments to the Ghana Frequency Registration and Control Board were made by the Head of State on the advice of the National Security Council.87 As noted by Allotey and Akorli, colonial administrators had previously secured telegraph infrastructure as a strategic tool during conflicts with the Ashanti Kingdom, reinforcing the perception of communications as an instrument of political control.88 When the telecommunications sector was liberalised in the 1990s to attract private investment, regulatory reforms retained this security-oriented framework, a structure first formalised in 1996 and carried forward into the 2008 Act.89
Examining Opposing Views
The argument in favour of presidential control rests on the strategic importance of information and communications infrastructure. Historically, the Ghanaian state has regarded oversight of communications as essential to maintaining stability. This approach remains embedded in law, as both the 1996 and 2008 Acts require representation from the National Security Council on the NCA’s governing board.90 Retaining appointment authority allows the executive to ensure that regulatory decisions remain aligned with national security priorities and broader state interests.
In contrast, critics argue that the concentration of appointment power undermines regulatory independence and constrains industry growth. Where regulatory leadership is appointed at the discretion of the executive, the Authority risks being perceived as politically aligned rather than technically impartial. Branttie observes that such arrangements have enabled the NCA to adopt measures aimed at revenue extraction, including the imposition of price floors on international calls, rather than policies designed to promote competition.91 Additionally, the absence of secure tenure for regulatory leadership results in frequent changes following electoral cycles, creating uncertainty that discourages long-term investment and innovation.92
Policy Advice
To strengthen the regulatory framework, the review team should consider targeted reforms. First, appointment processes should be insulated from sole presidential discretion by involving Parliament or an independent, multi-stakeholder body to assess technical competence and suitability for office. Second, the Act should provide for fixed and staggered terms of office for the Director-General and Board members that do not coincide with presidential election cycles, reducing political turnover.93 Finally, statutory transparency obligations should require the publication of reasons for major regulatory decisions, limiting perceptions of bias or revenue-driven regulation.94
Conclusion
The appointment powers contained in Act 769 are best understood as vestiges of a security-focused regulatory model. While originally intended to protect state interests, their continued operation now risks undermining regulatory credibility and sectoral growth. A sustainable telecommunications industry requires a regulator accountable primarily to the law and technical standards, rather than executive discretion.