Introduction
The proposition that digital and internet technologies threaten the National Communications Authority’s (NCA) revenue base raises a legitimate regulatory concern rooted in structural change rather than regulatory failure. The NCA was established within a communications environment in which value creation was closely tied to the allocation and control of hertzian spectrum. Licensing scarcity-based resources and regulating spectrum-dependent operators, therefore, formed the backbone of its revenue model.134 Digital technologies such as WiFi, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Video-on-Demand (VoD), and other over-the-top (OTT) services have altered this equilibrium by enabling communications and content delivery without direct reliance on licensed spectrum. The result is a gradual migration of economic activity away from the layers of the communications value chain traditionally regulated by the NCA.
This phenomenon is neither unique to Ghana nor unexpected. Comparable disruptions have compelled regulatory recalibration in several jurisdictions, particularly within Europe, where the erosion of spectrum-based revenues has been addressed through legal modernisation rather than attempts to reassert spectrum control. This paper, therefore, examines the extent to which the digital shift threatens the NCA’s revenue and proposes policy and legislative reforms aimed at preserving regulatory sustainability in a converged digital environment.
Primary Revenue Sources Of The NCA
The funding architecture of the NCA is set out principally in the National Communications Authority Act, 2008 (Act 769).135 Section 20(1) provides that the Authority may retain fees, charges, and other moneys payable under the Act or any other enactment, alongside parliamentary allocations, grants, investment income, and funds approved by the Minister for Finance.136 The Electronic Communications Act, 2008 (Act 775) operationalises this framework by empowering the NCA to grant licences and authorisations for electronic communications networks and services, and to charge corresponding fees.137
In practice, the NCA’s internally generated funds are closely linked to the regulation of spectrum-based activities. Act 775 authorises the NCA to assign and manage radio frequencies and to levy spectrum assignment and usage fees.138 In addition, licensed operators are required to pay annual regulatory fees calculated as a percentage of net revenues derived from licensed activities.139 Although the NCA is not exclusively funded by spectrum licensing, the statutory design of Acts 769 and 775 demonstrates that a substantial portion of its revenue is indirectly dependent on the commercial performance of spectrum-based operators. To that extent, the claim that the NCA relies heavily on a Hertzian model is doctrinally sound.
This structure reflects the traditional legal conception of licensing as permission to undertake an activity otherwise prohibited by statute, historically deployed to control market entry, protect monopolies, and impose public interest obligations. As market liberalisation progressed and monopolies were dismantled, licensing evolved into a regulatory tool rather than a gatekeeping device. However, its continued anchoring in spectrum scarcity has limited its adaptability to application-layer services that generate economic value without engaging licensed resources.
Digital Technologies Threatening NCA’s Revenue Sources
Digital and internet technologies threaten the NCA’s revenue not by operating unlawfully, but by operating efficiently outside the assumptions embedded in existing legislation. VoIP services allow users to make voice calls using internet connectivity rather than circuit-switched mobile or fixed networks. OTT messaging and calling applications perform functions that are functionally equivalent to licensed telephony services but do not themselves require spectrum assignments. Similarly, Wi-Fi-based communications rely on license-exempt frequency bands, the use of which attracts no spectrum fees under Ghanaian law.140
VoD and streaming platforms further illustrate this displacement. Traditional broadcasting services require frequencies allocated by the NCA and are subject to licensing fees and regulatory oversight.141 OTT streaming services deliver audiovisual content over broadband networks and are not licensed as broadcasters under Act 775. The consequence is that consumption shifts from regulated broadcast platforms to unregulated internet platforms, eroding the economic base from which spectrum and broadcasting license fees are derived.
This phenomenon is best explained through the concept of convergence. Technological convergence collapses the historical separation between telecommunications, broadcasting, and internet services, allowing a single application to deliver voice, messaging, and audiovisual content. Acts 769 and 775, however, are structured around service categories that presume technological separation. As these boundaries dissolve, regulatory obligations and the revenues attached to them fail to attach to the new loci of value creation. Comparable concerns have driven reform in Europe, where regulators concluded that sustaining revenue and regulatory legitimacy required redefining services rather than extending legacy licensing models to digital technologies.
The implications of convergence are particularly evident in the regulation of electronic communications services. Electronic communications services encompass public and private services, value-added services, radiocommunication services, and closed user group services provided over electronic communications networks. The rise of over-the-top (OTT) services, such as internet-based voice calls, enterprise communication platforms, and video-on-demand services, demonstrates the limits of a framework anchored in frequency licensing. These services cannot realistically be subjected to spectrum-based control without high economic and innovation costs, particularly as they increasingly eliminate the need for frequency-dependent delivery. The experience of Radio Gold is instructive: following the shutdown of its terrestrial broadcast frequency by the NCA, the station continued operations through online radio streaming, a mode of transmission that does not require traditional frequency licensing. This shift illustrates that the regulatory challenge is no longer one of enforcement but of scope, and that the conversation around authorisation must expand beyond spectrum scarcity towards a framework that permits operation while ensuring regulatory visibility and proportionate contribution.142
Solutions To the Threat To NCA’s Revenue Sources
The appropriate regulatory response lies not in extending spectrum licensing to digital services, but in modernising the concept of authorisation. Authorisation, properly understood, is a legal permission framework that allows entities to provide electronic communications services without relying on spectrum scarcity as its organising principle. While Act 775 recognises licences and authorisations, its application remains tethered to traditional service classifications and does not adequately capture global, application-layer service providers.143
This distinction mirrors developments in other jurisdictions. Within the European Union, the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) was adopted precisely to address the regulatory blind spot created by OTT services. By expanding the definition of “electronic communications service” to include number-independent interpersonal communications services, the EECC subjects functionally equivalent OTT services to regulatory obligations comparable to those imposed on traditional operators, notwithstanding the absence of spectrum use.144 The lesson is that revenue sustainability follows legal classification, not technological control.
A modern authorisation regime would therefore be technology-neutral and service-neutral, focusing instead on economic activity and market impact. Such a framework would enable the NCA to impose proportionate regulatory fees on providers whose services substitute for, or compete directly with, licensed communications services, even where no spectrum is used.145
Policy And Legislative Proposals
Policy reform must precede legislative amendment. At the policy level, Ghana should adopt a converged communications policy that recognises all electronic communications services, whether delivered via spectrum, cable, or internet protocol, as part of a single regulatory ecosystem. This approach reflects international practice, including in Finland, Germany, and Norway, where technology-neutral regulation has been used to ensure that OTT communication services fall within the regulatory perimeter without replicating spectrum-based licensing requirements.146
Legislatively, Act 775 should be amended to expand the definition of “electronic communications service” to include OTT interpersonal communication services. This would align Ghana’s framework with international best practice, including the approach adopted under the EECC, which brings number-independent interpersonal communications services within the regulatory perimeter.147 A unified digital authorisation regime should then replace fragmented service-specific licences, allowing the NCA to levy revenue-based regulatory fees on qualifying providers.
Within this framework, an electronic communications service would be defined as any service normally provided for remuneration that consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance or enabling of communications, irrespective of the underlying technology. Electronic communications service providers would therefore include traditional network operators, internet service providers, and OTT communication platforms meeting defined thresholds. Targeted levies on high-revenue digital platforms, akin to the Swiss model of turnover-based contributions for public policy objectives, further demonstrate that revenue capture can be achieved without distorting competition or innovation.148
Advantages And Disadvantages Of The Proposed Solutions
These proposals offer clear advantages. They broaden the NCA’s revenue base beyond spectrum scarcity, promote competitive neutrality between traditional operators and OTT providers, and enhance regulatory sustainability in a converged market.149 However, they are not without drawbacks. Enforcement against foreign-based providers presents jurisdictional challenges, and poorly calibrated fees risk discouraging innovation or being passed on to consumers. These concerns are not unique to Ghana and have been addressed elsewhere through revenue thresholds, registration obligations, and cooperation mechanisms between national regulators, rather than through direct content or network control. This contrasts with the approach initially adopted in Uganda, where the government was ultimately compelled to retreat from imposing a tax on over-the-top (OTT) services.150
Conclusion
Digital technologies undoubtedly disrupt the spectrum-dependent revenue model upon which the NCA was originally structured. Yet the threat they pose is neither sudden nor insurmountable. It arises from a mismatch between twentieth-century regulatory categories and twenty-first-century communications realities. Acts 769 and 775 remain anchored in assumptions of service separation and spectrum dependence that no longer reflect how communications value is created.
The solution lies in legal modernisation rather than regulatory expansion. By re-conceptualising authorisation, updating statutory definitions, and adopting a fair-contribution model for digital services—following the path taken in comparable jurisdictions—Ghana can secure the NCA’s financial sustainability while preserving an open and innovative digital environment. The challenge, therefore, is not technological disruption itself, but the pace at which policy and the law respond to it.151